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       Hon. Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge of the United States*
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by
designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
         
No. 05-2971




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
    Respondent
         
On Petition for Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(INS No. A96-264-094)
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 18, 2006
Before:  SLOVITER, AMBRO, and MICHEL , Circuit Judges*
(Filed: April 25, 2006 )
         
OPINION
2MICHEL, Chief Judge.
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
denying an application for asylum and withholding of removal.  We deny the petition.
I
Hery Sukamto is an ethnic Chinese, a practicing Christian, and a citizen of
Indonesia.  Mr. Sukamto entered the United States on a F1 student visa on November 22,
2000, but decided not to enroll at the designated university, the University of Houston,
and remained in the United States illegally.  Two-and-a-half years later, Mr. Sukamto
wished to enroll in school, but was informed by a university admissions official that,
because of his immigration status, he could not attend school in the United States without
first returning to Indonesia.  Instead, on March 24, 2003, Mr. Sukamto affirmatively
applied for asylum and withholding of removal.  
Mr. Sukamto stated in his asylum application that he sought withholding based on
his race, religion, and membership in a particular group.  He indicated in his asylum
application that he had been harmed in the past and that he feared being harmed and
subjected to torture if he was to return to Indonesia.  In an accompanying affidavit, Mr.
Sukamto stated that because he is of Chinese descent, he is a minority in Indonesia and is
“labeled as ‘non-native’ or [a] ‘second-class citizen[].”  For example, Mr. Sukamto stated
that he is frequently asked to prove his citizenship status even though he was born in
Indonesia.  As specific acts of past harm, Mr. Sukamto referenced a looting of his
3grandfather’s store and beating suffered by his grandfather during Indonesian riots in
1965, allegedly witnessed by his mother.  He recounted that, while in high school, a
Muslim teacher once questioned him publicly and rudely about Christianity.  He recalled
that his Muslim classmates stole his stationery, hat, and school tie, and called him names
on a daily basis.  He stated that on one occasion, when he burned his money rather than
giving it to a Muslim classmate, he was beaten in the stomach.  
Mr. Sukamto also claimed three more recent incidents of harm.  First, Mr.
Sukamto stated that in September 1996, the gate to his parents’ home was damaged by
two groups fighting at a nearby political gathering, and surmises that his family was
targeted because they are of Chinese ethnicity.  Second, he recounted that the
neighborhood chief threatened him and his uncle with a “large saber” and accused the
Sukamto family of creating noise disturbances by virtue of the “cracker” business that the
family operated out of their home.  Third, Mr. Sukamto suspects that his parents’
plumbing system was damaged in July 2000 by neighborhood Muslims, who also
allegedly stole water from them during the “dry season”, but concedes that he lacks
evidence to prove this claim.
After interviewing Mr. Sukamto, an asylum officer referred Mr. Sukamto’s
application to the Immigration Judge (“IJ”).  On May 8, 2003, the former Immigration
and Naturalization Service (now part of the Department of Homeland Security, see
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002)),
4issued a Notice to Appear commencing removal proceedings pursuant to Section
237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).  
At the Master Calendar Hearing on June 19, 2003, Mr. Sukamto admitted that he
had entered the United States on a F1 visa, had not enrolled in school, and had remained
in the United States illegally, and conceded removability under the INA.  He was released
pending an asylum hearing.  Following his asylum hearing on January 7, 2004, the IJ
issued an oral decision denying Mr. Sukamto’s applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and withholding under the United Nations Convention Against Torture.  
The IJ found that Mr. Sukamto failed to file for asylum within the one year period
prescribed by 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) and that the excuse offered by Mr. Sukamto, that
he relied on misinformation from his friends, did not constitute an “extraordinary reason”
justifying waiver of the deadline.  The IJ also found that Mr. Sukamto was neither
subjected to persecution nor had a well-founded fear of persecution.  Rather, the IJ
concluded that Mr. Sukamto departed from Indonesia to pursue educational and economic
opportunities in the United States.  The IJ granted Mr. Sukamto voluntary departure until
March 8, 2004, with an alternate order of removal to Indonesia.
Mr. Sukamto timely appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”).  On May 26, 2005, the BIA issued a per curiam order dismissing Mr. Sukamto’s
appeal and “adopted and affirmed” the IJ’s on-the-record oral decision.  The BIA
acknowledged that Mr. Sukamto suffered some discrimination and harassment in
5Indonesia, but held that these two factors alone do not constitute “persecution” within the
meaning of the INA.  Because Mr. Sukamto failed to post the voluntary departure bond
ordered by the IJ, the BIA vacated the grant of voluntary departure.
Mr. Sukamto timely petitioned to this court.  Because Mr. Sukamto raises only a
factual challenge to the BIA determination that there were not extraordinary
circumstances warranting waiver of the one year time limitation for asylum applications,
we lack jurisdiction over that portion of his petition for review.  See Sukwanputra v.
Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 633-34 (3d Cir. 2006).  Under Section 242(a) of the INA, 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a), however, we do have jurisdiction over the withholding of removal.
II
To successfully petition for withholding of removal, an alien must "show that if
returned to his country, it is more likely than not that the alien's life or freedom would be
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion."  Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 726 (3d Cir. 2003). 
Where the BIA issues an order on the merits rather than a summary affirmance, we
review the decision of the BIA, not the IJ.  Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir.
2002).  Here, because the BIA “adopted and affirmed” the findings of the IJ, we also
review the findings of the IJ as incorporated by reference into the BIA decision.  Id.
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), “administrative findings of fact are conclusive
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”
6In this petition, Mr. Sukamto argues that a reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude that he was subjected to persecution and that he demonstrated a
clear probability that he would face persecution or torture upon return to Indonesia.  We
disagree.  The IJ cited specific, cogent reasons for concluding that Mr. Sukamto was
neither subjected to persecution nor had a well-founded fear of persecution or torture, and
responded thoroughly to each of Mr. Sukamto’s claims.  
The IJ concluded that Mr. Sukamto’s true motive for coming to the United States
was “to pursue educational and economic opportunities”, citing as support Mr. Sukamto’s
F1 visa status upon admission and his testimony that he came to the United States to
attend school, but decided one week after arriving that his family would be better served
by financial assistance he could provide through employment here.  The IJ additionally
cited Mr. Sukamto’s testimony that he began working one month after his arrival in the
United States and that he applied for asylum only after learning from a university
admissions official that, because of his immigration status, he could not attend school in
the United States without first returning to Indonesia, which he could not afford to do.
The IJ found that Mr. Sukamto was unlikely to suffer harm upon returning to
Indonesia.  The IJ emphasized Mr. Sukamto’s testimony that his mother wished for him to
return to Indonesia and his inability to explain “why a mother would wish a son to return
home if he faced the likelihood of persecution.”  The IJ considered Mr. Sukamto’s
testimony of past discrimination and harassment, but categorized as “no more than
7speculation” Mr. Sukamto’s testimony that he feared that his parents’ home would suffer
property damage during an upcoming political election.  The IJ noted that conditions in
Indonesia have not worsened for persons in Mr. Sukamto’s status, and cited the United
States Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report for Indonesia for
2002, which in fact shows improved inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations between
Chinese, Christians, and native Muslims in Indonesia.  The BIA acknowledged that Mr.
Sukamto had suffered some discrimination and harassment in Indonesia, but correctly
held that these two factors alone do not constitute “persecution” within the meaning of
the INA.  Based on the IJ’s findings, the BIA correctly held that Mr. Sukamto “was not
detained, harmed, or threatened by the government, or by persons a government is
unwilling or unable to control, on account of a protected ground” and correctly concluded
that Mr. Sukamto “failed to show that he more likely than not would be tortured.”
Because Mr. Sukamto has not pointed to evidence that would compel a reasonable
adjudicator to conclude that he was subjected to persecution, and has not demonstrated a
clear probability that he would face persecution or torture upon return to Indonesia, the
petition for review is denied. 
